If an SSL connection becamse disabled or suspended before became open,
it could (under the right circumstances) wind up without ever getting
its write callback disabled.
The most correct fix is probably more subtle, and involves checking
all caseswhen a write callback is enabled or disabled. This fix is
more blunt, and explicitly checks whether the callback should have
been disabled at the end of the callback to prevent infinite looping.
Diagnosed with help from Sebastian Hahn
First, handle cases where we have %s in a tt_want or tt_assert.
Second, add tt_want_*_op that do a tt_*_op test, but do not exit the
test on failure.
We should push these upstream to tinytest some time.
NOTE: This is not the official release until I tag it. If you see
this commit, and you decide that Libevent 2.0.8-rc is now
finalized, you might get something besides 2.0.8-rc.
When handshaking, we listen for reads or writes from the
transport. But when we're connected, we start out with writes enabled
and reads disabled, which means we should not have the transport read
for us.
Previously, whenever writing was disabled on a bufferevent_filter (or
a filtering SSL bufferevent), we would stop writing on the underlying
bufferevent. This would make for trouble, though, since if you
implemented common patterns like "stop writing once data X has been
flushed", your bufferevent filter would disable the underlying
bufferevent after the data was flushed to the underlying bufferevent,
but before actually having it written to the network.
Now, we have filters leave their underlying bufferevents enabled for
reading and writing for reading and writing immediately. They are not
disabled, unless the user wants to disable them, which is now allowed.
To handle the case where we want to choke reading on the underlying
bufferevent because the filter no longer wants to read, we use
bufferevent_suspend_read(). This is analogous to the way that we use
bufferevent_suspend_write() to suspend writing on a filtering
bufferevent when the underlying bufferevent's output buffer has hit
its high watermark.
Our old code was too zealous about deleting the refill events that
would actually make connections able to read or write again after
they had run out of bandwidth. Under some circumstances, this could
cause a bufferevent to never actually refill one of its
rate-limiting buckets.
Also, the code treated setting a per-connection rate-limit on a
connection that already had a group-limit as if it were changing the
limit on a connection whose allocation had already run out.
This patch fixes both of those problems.
We were looking at the number of bytes read on the wbio, not in the
rbio. But these are usually different BIOs, and the reading is
supposed to happen on the rbio.
The old evhttp_decode_uri() function would act as tough it was doing
an (illegal, undefined) decode operation on a whole URL at once, and
treat + characters following a ? as different from + characters
preceding one. But that's not useful: If you are decoding a URI
before splitting off query parameters, you are begging to fail as soon
as somebody gives you a value with an encoded & in it.
The new evhttp_uridecode() function takes an argument that says
whether to decode + signs. Both uridecode and uriencode also now
support encoding or decoding to strings with internal 0-valued
characters.
Perviously, some characters not listed as "unreserved" by RFC 3986
(notably "!$'()*+,/:=@") were not encoded by evhttp_encode_uri. This
made trouble, especially when encoding path components (where @ and /
are bad news) and parameters (where + should get encoded so it doesn't
later decode into a space).
Spotted by Bas Verhoeven.
We already detected certain malformed queries, but we responded by
aborting the query-parsing process half-way through without telling
the user. Now, if query-parsing fails, no headers are returned, and
evhttp_parse_query returns -1.
The writev() call is limited to at most IOV_MAX iovecs (or UIO_MAXIOV,
depending on whom you ask). This isn't a problem anywhere we've
tested except on OpenSolaris, where IOV_MAX was a mere 16.
This patch makes us go from "use up to 128 iovecs when writing" to
"use up to 128 iovecs when writing, or IOV_MAX/UIO_MAXIOV, whichever
is less". This is still wrong if you somehow find a platform that
defines IOV_MAX < UIO_MAXIOV, but I hereby claim that such a platform
is too stupid to worry about for now.
Found by Michael Herf.
