Nathaniel Wesley Filardo 6e95d74fbd Update TLS protocol support (#2587)
* Update TLS protocol support

TLS1.0 is past PCI's EOL; BEAST is no more
Enable elliptic curve key exchanges
	Do not enable the smallest ECs for security
	Do not enable the largest ECs for computational time
	Do not enable 25519 (sad) because it doesn't go across the wire
Drop non-PFS key exchanges
Drop ARC4, Blowfish, DES, genprime, XTEA code
Drop renegotiation support completely
	It takes so much heap that it's not likely to work out well

Tidy handling of SSL_BUFFER_SIZE

Update docs
Drop mention of startcom, since they are no more, for letsencrypt

* Update mbedtls to 2.7.7

Preserve our vsnprintf and platform hacks

* Introduce TLS maximum fragment size knob

Reduce buffer size to 4Ki by default and advertize that.  That's the
largest we can advertize with the TLS MFL extension, so there's no
point in making them larger.  The truly adventurous can re-raise
SSL_BUFFER_SIZE and undefine the SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_CODE and get
back to the earlier behavior.

* Default to mbedTLS debug with DEVELOP_VERSION
2019-01-15 17:02:32 +01:00

582 lines
17 KiB
C

/*
* HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90)
*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
/*
* The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication.
* http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
* References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012).
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
#include <stdio.h>
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
}
/*
* HMAC_DRBG context initialization
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
#endif
}
/*
* HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2)
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info );
unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1;
unsigned char sep[1];
unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
int ret;
for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ )
{
/* Step 1 or 4 */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
sep, 1 ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( rounds == 2 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
/* Step 2 or 5 */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
}
exit:
mbedtls_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) );
return( ret );
}
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
(void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
}
/*
* Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/*
* Set initial working state.
* Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
* MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V,
mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 (arabic) + 9.2 (Roman)
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
{
unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
size_t seedlen;
int ret;
/* III. Check input length */
if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
ctx->entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
}
memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
/* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */
if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy,
seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
seedlen = ctx->entropy_len;
/* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */
if( additional != NULL && len != 0 )
{
memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len );
seedlen += len;
}
/* 2. Update state */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
/* 3. Reset reseed_counter */
ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
exit:
/* 4. Done */
mbedtls_zeroize( seed, seedlen );
return( ret );
}
/*
* HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1)
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info,
int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_entropy,
const unsigned char *custom,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
size_t entropy_len, md_size;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
/*
* Set initial working state.
* Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
* MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size );
ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
/*
* See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by
* each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2,
* min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength.
*
* (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.)
*/
entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */
md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */
32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */
/*
* For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce
* (Again, matches test vectors.)
*/
ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len * 3 / 2;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len;
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Set prediction resistance
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
int resistance )
{
ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance;
}
/*
* Set entropy length grabbed for reseeds
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len )
{
ctx->entropy_len = len;
}
/*
* Set reseed interval
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval )
{
ctx->reseed_interval = interval;
}
/*
* HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data:
* 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman)
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t out_len,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng;
size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info );
size_t left = out_len;
unsigned char *out = output;
/* II. Check request length */
if( out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG );
/* III. Check input length */
if( add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
/* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */
if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */
( ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ||
ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */
}
/* 2. Use additional data if any */
if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx,
additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
}
/* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */
while( left != 0 )
{
size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len );
out += use_len;
left -= use_len;
}
/* 6. Update */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx,
additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
/* 7. Update reseed counter */
ctx->reseed_counter++;
exit:
/* 8. Done */
return( ret );
}
/*
* HMAC_DRBG random function
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
#endif
return( ret );
}
/*
* Free an HMAC_DRBG context
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
#endif
mbedtls_md_free( &ctx->md_ctx );
mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
{
int ret;
FILE *f;
unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) != sizeof( buf ) )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
goto exit;
}
ret = 0;
exit:
fclose( f );
mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path )
{
int ret = 0;
FILE *f;
size_t n;
unsigned char buf[ MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ];
if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR );
fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END );
n = (size_t) ftell( f );
fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET );
if( n > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT )
{
fclose( f );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
}
if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
else
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n );
fclose( f );
mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
/* Dummy checkup routine */
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
{
(void) verbose;
return( 0 );
}
#else
#define OUTPUT_LEN 80
/* From a NIST PR=true test vector */
static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = {
0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f,
0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11,
0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42,
0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3,
0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 };
static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = {
0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39,
0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94,
0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54,
0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e,
0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab,
0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3,
0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 };
/* From a NIST PR=false test vector */
static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = {
0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66,
0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8,
0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3,
0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf };
static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = {
0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f,
0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6,
0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a,
0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec,
0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd,
0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49,
0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 };
/* "Entropy" from buffer */
static size_t test_offset;
static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
const unsigned char *p = data;
memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len );
test_offset += len;
return( 0 );
}
#define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \
{ \
if( verbose != 0 ) \
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \
return( 1 ); \
}
/*
* Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx;
unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx );
/*
* PR = True
*/
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : " );
test_offset = 0;
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info,
hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr,
NULL, 0 ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON );
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
/*
* PR = False
*/
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : " );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx );
test_offset = 0;
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( &ctx, md_info,
hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr,
NULL, 0 ) );
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) );
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
CHK( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx );
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */